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BOOK REVIEWS
DIVIDING THE WATERS, A CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY BE-
TWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO. By NORRIS HUND-
LEY, JR. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1966.
Pp. ix, 186. $6.95.
Up to now, literature concerning international rivers has been scarce.
Perhaps this is due to the fact that until recently concern with interna-
tional rivers was limited to problems of boundaries and navigation. Today,
the general scarcity of water throughout the world, the increased dedica-
tion of land to farming, and the growing need for energy have caused
countries to examine the possibility of exploiting the international hy-
draulic currents as a possible supplement to their internal water sources.
The problems which arise from the possibility of this exploitation are
relatively new. Besides the lack of methods to deal with international wa-
ters, conflicting foreign interests have complicated the matter, with the
result that development of legal standards has been disperse and unsatis-
factory. Furthermore, each river basin and water system differs from an-
other. Traditional ideas and standard definitions have been further con-
fused by the infiltration of economic concepts and interests. Nevertheless,
some progress is noticeable. The problem is discussed more and more fre-
quently in scientific congresses, in international meetings, and by special-
ists; it has already begun to assume a definite significance.
Controversies between the several countries have acted as an important
catalyst in the difficult integration of standards concerning the exploitation
of international water currents. Of particular consequence is the water
dispute between the United States and Mexico. The confrontation of op-
posing concepts and the necessity of adjusting several situations which
urgently required solution by both countries have resulted in a valuable
body of ideas and developments. True, there is still much to be done. The
need to formulate more definite standards is imperative since the hy-
draulic resources of the world are becoming exhausted. A logical, prac-
tical, and just solution must be found.
Due to the above problems the book by Professor Hundley has been
timely published. It contributes new and impartial analyses of this debated
issue and provides fresh and unbiased information in an interesting way.
The book is mainly concerned with the struggle between the United
States and Mexico to reach a legal solution to the important political prob-
lem of the international distribution of waters. This legal solution must be
reached without the assistance of accepted precedents or pre-established
standards. Concededly, the treaty of 1906 between the two countries, con-
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cerning the distribution of the waters of the upper part of the Bravo River,
was an important step. It was the first treaty of its kind in the world, and
until that time there had been no investigations anywhere which could
clarify the situations which confronted the diplomats of both nations.
Hundley states, however, that although the treaty of 1906 was suitable
for the circumstances existing at that time, it lacked foresight and was
the product of elementary drafting techniques. It is therefore inadequate
to deal with current problems.
The treaty of 1944 attempted to reach a final solution of the problems
between the two countries concerning international water currents. It was
preceded by violent and well-organized resistance by the riparians of the
upper Colorado River. This conflict is carefully investigated and studied
by Hundley. In a concise, elegant, and most illustrative style he discusses
the facts which led to the conflict. One must conclude that, in view of the
attitude of the riparian farmers of the Colorado and Gila Rivers who had
appropriated almost all useful waters, it is surprising that Mexico was able
to obtain some of the water. In this part of the book Professor Hundley
gives a most interesting example of the powerful effect of water on in-
ternal and international politics. He presents a psychological portrait of
those persons who took part in the bargaining, and an analysis of the inter-
ests which influenced each of them. The struggle in the United States Sen-
ate for the ratification of the pact is sparklingly disclosed, and the author's
clear commentary elucidates many aspects which had been previously un-
noticed and are now important.
It is obvious, as Hundley points out, that the 1944 Treaty for the Dis-
tribution of Waters of the Bravo, Colorado and Tijuana Rivers could
have been better constructed and more precise. It resolved only the main
point of the controversy, and unfortunately left the rest of the matters
open. For example, the concepts "extraordinary drought" and "water
quality" did not have the same scope for the two parties signing the treaty,
and for this reason conflicts began anew as soon as the water flow in the
Colorado diminished. The problem of salinity arose and, once more, the
doctrinary concepts had to be confronted. The treaty, precariously put on
trial, led only to temporary solutions of doubtful'pragmatism and not to
definitive legal solutions.
Hundley deals quite well with this new dispute, and he correctly states
that the provisional Mexican-North American settlement of March 22,
1965, does not provide a final solution to the quality of theMexican por-
tion of the waters of the Colorado River. As the author clearly indicates,
this problem soon must be solved to the complete satisfaction of both par-
ties. If it is not, the very scarcity of the water could provide new and
more serious incidents and challenge the entire efficacy of the treaty.
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The future does not seem very promising. The increasing demand for
water by the dehydrating riparian states of the Colorado River and the
needs of the northwestern part of Mexico indicate the possibility of the
disputes becoming more accentuated. Moreover, what has been gained in
understanding may be lost through lack of vision. Perhaps, while there is
still time, it will be necessary to bring about new complementary treaties.
Be that as it may, books as wholesome and impartial as the one by Profes-
sor Hundley, will be extremely valuable in helping to reduce the area of
conflict. In addition, Hundley must be credited with having written a
pleasing, nimble, and illustrative narrative of a confusingly technical, po-
litical, and diplomatic entanglement. His book helps to dissipate doubts
related to the question of the international distribution of waters and will
be extremely useful in reaching adequate solutions for similar problems
in other parts of the world. Furthermore, it will help to create more effec-
tive standards for a better understanding between Mexico and the United
States concerning this problem.
Cisar Sepii!veda*
INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET. By HENRY G.
MANNE. New York: The Free Press. 1966. Pp. 274. $6.95.
Professor Manne has attempted to equate insider trading profits in the
stock market (profits from trading on information not publicly disclosed)
to the entrepreneurial profit concept of the economic theories of Frank
Knight and Joseph Schumpeter (profits which initially arise automatically
as a result of some new innovation in the economy). His thesis is that
insider trading in all markets, in all securities, of all corporations is the
only proper method of compensating entrepreneurial contributions to our
society. His grandiose conclusion is, "People pressing for the rule barring
insider trading may inadvertently be tampering with one of the well-
springs of American prosperity.'"
The book begins by stating that the entire problem of insider trading
has been exclusively the province of lawyers and law professors who have
concentrated on settling disputes between two live human beings. It co-
cedes that in this context it is easy to conclude that there is something un-
fair (unequal) about insider trading. Professor Manne suggests that more
important questions than those concerning individual rights and duties
* Professor of Law and Former Dean, National University of Mexico.
'MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET' 110 (1966).
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are those of the economist: How are all shareholders affected by the prac-
tice? Does it result in a desirable allocation of economic resources? And
does the return to insiders reflect a "competitive" or a "monopoly" gain in
the economic sense?
After analyzing early economic writings on the subject, the book traces
the development of the law from Strong v. Repide' through the complaint
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.3 (decided subsequent to publication of the book). There
follows a brief discussion of the provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 and the rules thereunder, which Professor Manne concludes are
valuable anti-manipulative devices, but valueless in dealing with the in-
sider trading problem. The next chapters contain an elaborate analysis of
the types of information which affect or may affect the market generally
or an individual security. Information which qualifies as "insider infor-
mation" is that which (a) if known (and all other factors were held
constant), would substantially affect the price of a security, and (b) can
be exploited in the market by those possessing the information before it
is made public. Professor Manne treats such information as a commodity
having a determinable market value. Such news is variously described as
"volatile" and "more mercurial than mercury."
Mechanisms for marketing such information at a profit for the seller
are then described. The simplest device is the barter of information by cor-
porate executives on the golf course. A more elaborate method involves the
selection of directors for their abilityto trade information rather than for
their ability to direct. The most elaborate exchange market for "inside
information," however, is the investment banking house. These are de-
scribed as clearing houses for information, which function effectively both
as information depositories (through control over the appointment of di-
rectors), and as distributors of information to insiders of other corpora-
tions on what may best be described as a "what have you done for me
lately" basis. The distribution function is facilitated through the use of
finesse in handling "priority lists" and discretionary accounts.
Professor Manne then devotes two chapters to the market effects of a
free insider trading rule; no insider trading rule; suspension of trading
prior to public announcement rule; and, for analytical purposes only, a
free insider trading in puts, calls, and options rule. The effect of each of
such rules on various types of "trader-investors" is explained in hypothet-
ical circumstances. For purposes of analysis, traders are divided into
"know-it-all" insiders and "know-nothing" outsiders. The know-nothing
outsiders are further divided into short-term traders, long-term investors,
2213 U.S. 419 (1909).
3258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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time-function traders, price-function traders (including "chartists" and
technical traders, those who trade on the basis of rate of change or other
theories involving present and past price movements), and outright spec-
ulators. The book concedes that there are several circumstances under
which insider trading may result in a real but undeterminable loss to out-
siders but concludes that this is not necessarily an overall economic loss
to the community. Apparently, outsider-losers will have to be satisfied with
this consolation rather than with compensation for their losses. Professor
Manne concludes that his laborious discussion of what may happen in the
market does not constitute a strong argument for insider trading. On the
other hand, market analysis does not present any strong argument in de-
fense of a rule against insider trading. In fact, his entire analysis does little
more than demonstrate that the market for securities which involves
countless individual decisions to purchase and sell at any given time, for
an equally countless number of reasons, may defy rational analysis on any
meaningful basis.
The next several chapters are devoted to a critical analysis of the "entre-
preneurial" theories of Knight and Schumpeter. The distinction between
the functions of the manager, the capitalist, and the entrepreneur, and the
methods and means of compensating each, are clearly drawn. It is pointed
out that one man may be performing all of these socio-economic functions
to a greater or lesser degree at any given time. The entrepreneur is referred
to as one who "is to make new combinations of productive factors," "the
innovator," the "organizer of uncertainties," and he "who sets progress in
motion." Professor Manne concludes that this function is critical to the
survival of any corporation in a competitive society; the crucial theoretical
difficulty has been to find an appropriate method of compensation for such
services. He rejects compensation such as salaries, bonuses, profit-sharing
plans and stock options as appropriate for the entrepreneur although he
concedes they are proper for managerial services. Without citing any au-
thority that entrepreneurial activity is not adequately rewarded at present
by society, he concludes that entrepreneurial activity can be compensated
only by giving the entrepreneur "a piece of the action," that is, free insider
trading.
Professor Manne contends that the entrepreneur cannot reap the full
reward of his economic contribution unless he captures its entire value by
purchasing all of the outstanding shares of his own corporation prior to
public announcement of this "contribution." The entrepreneur should
therefore be allowed to reap all the rewards immediately possible by trad-
ing in the stock of his own company; deposit the information with a
clearing house enabling other outsider-insiders to share his profits; and
thus finally to earn a credit which will be repaid at some time in the fu-
1967]
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ture, enabling him to reap insider profits from another's contribution.
This work, like most writings on currently controversial subjects, raises
more questions than it answers. Nowhere does Professor Manne support
the essential propositions that there is any shortage of entrepreneurial
talent, that this talent is not adequately compensated, that increased com-
pensation will produce increased entrepreneurial talent or contributions, or
that insider trading as a particular form of compensation will produce such
results. Even conceding that compensating the entrepreneur is a present
major economic problem, mere juxtaposition of the problem with an
analysis of insider trading is not equivalent to applying the economic
theory of Professor Schumpeter to the insider trading problem. To permit
free insider trading solely for the purpose of filling a gap in economic
theory does not solve the practical problem of insider trading. Further-
more, in spite of valiant endeavor and a disproportionate display of erudi-
tion,4 the book fails to fill the gap in economic theory by failing to estab-
lish that insider trading profits will in any way equal entrepreneurial
profits in the economic sense. In order to establish this thesis, it is first
necessary to equate "entrepreneurs" to insiders. Manne admits that it is
access to the information alone that characterizes the insider and not job,
status, position, or any other factor. Very few insiders are in fact entre-
preneurs and if the defendants in past insider trading litigation, including
the cases discussed by Professor Manne, are taken as examples, the lion's
share of insider trading profits will fall to the golf companion, the director
who does not direct, the investment banker and his discretionary accounts,
and others who have performed no entrepreneurial services to society and
who therefore are not entitled to entrepreneurial profits. Manne's thesis is
that the full value of the entrepreneur's contribution will be reflected in
the increased market value of the stock. Although the individual entre-
preneur cannot reap the full benefits, he has the right to make a gift of a
portion of such profits to others participating in the information exchange.
Even if it be conceded that all members of the information pool are en-
trepreneurs, by association, the power over who receives the magnanimity
of the individual entrepreneur passes from him to the banker who runs the
information pool, perhaps on the basis of actual entrepreneurial contri-
bution but more likely upon some personal and hence more capricious
basis. For example, in the Texas Gulf case," Mr. Thomas Lamont, a direc-
tor of both Texas Gulf and the Morgan Guaranty Bank, saw fit to dis-
tribute informt;on and hence a portion of the insider profits, to various
" The textual discussion, itself, is 189 pages, the text of the opinions in three "insider trading"
cases account for another 32 pages, and there are 38 pages of notes, a substantial number of which
cite earlier writings of Professor Manne.
'SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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clients of the bank, a hospital, and the bank's own employees' profit-
sharing fund. Manne concedes that such evaluation more nearly resembles
an art than a science and further that the entire success of the whole
scheme of the information pool depends upon the successful performance
of this function of distributing the information to the right parties. It
should be pointed out that the particular investment banker running the
books may not perform any discernible entrepreneurial function. As a
practical, legal, social or economic matter, insiders do not equate to en-
trepreneurs.
A second unanswered problem the book raises in attempting to equate
insider profit with entrepreneurial profit is that substantial insider trading
profits may result when insiders sell before the release of bad news. Al-
though the-book discusses such profits, it does not face squarely the prob-
lem that bad news may not be a result of extrinsic factors, but may in
fact be the result of directors who fail to direct and the entrepreneur who
fails to perform his function. Manne argues that this compensation for
failure by members of the pool is counter-balanced by the inability to cap-
ture all of the profits to which entrepreneurs are entitled, and that the
loss to investors, in any event, is too small to be of any consequence. More-
over, the objection which Professor Manne raises regarding salaries, bon-
uses, profit-sharing plans and option plans as fitting entrepreneurial re-
wards are equally applicable to insider trading profits. The profits to be
made in insider trading may or may not bear a relationship to the pro-
longed value of the innovation but more likely will depend on totally out-
side factors. The tax consequences may or may not be equally disadvan-
tageous to the entrepreneur depending upon individual factors not dis-
cussed. The amount of insider trading profits received by the true en-
trepeneur who trades in the market by reason of his access to the informa-
tion pool will bear no more relationship to his entrepreneurial contribu-
tions, and quite possibly a great deal less, than bonuses, options and profit-
sharing plans, since insider trading profits are much more likely to depend
solely upon personal financial conditions at the time he receives his "hot
tip." Finally, as Professor Manne points out, the opportunity "to make a
killing" in any company stock occurs only approximately once each
ten years in the life of a New York Stock Exchange listed company. In-
sider profits will therefore not necessarily accrue to the entrepreneur at
any meaningful time in relation to his entrepreneurial contributions.
Entrepreneurial compensation under Professor Manne's theory must be
distributed to him over a period of time before and after his contribution
at such times as the "information pool" chooses to disclose to him (and
even then only in accordance with his priority rating at any particular
time) "hot tips" deposited with the pool. Also, the information which
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occurs only once in ten years may be totally fortuitous, unrelated in any
way to any "entrepreneurial activity." While the book sometimes tortu-
ously wrestles with such problems, if never convincingly resolves them.
As a practical, legal, and economic matter, the book fails to establish that
"insider profits" are the result of entrepreneurial activity or equate to
entrepreneurial profits.
The characteristic of the entrepreneur is that he innovates; the char-
acteristic of the insider is that he has access to information. Insider trad-
ing profits are those that result from trading on insider information, which
may or may not arise from innovational activity, and in fact often result
from a lack of innovational activity, either fortuitously or because of the
failure of the "innovators." Entrepreneurial profits, as Manne suggests, are
almost impossible to define, detect, or segregate from other types of eco-
nomic profits. They arise initially and immediately from innovational
activities. They are one of the types of "economic profits" of Schumpe-
terian economics, and it is the innovator and the economy that jointly reap
the benefits of this profit. Manne has presented no case that any benefit
to the economy will arise from permitting only "access to information
insiders" to share such profits with the entrepreneur rather than allowing
the economy to share the benefits with the entrepreneur. Indeed, he has
not even demonstrated that the entrepreneur will receive any greater share
of entrepreneurial profits than he now enjoys, regardless of whether the
courts adopt a free insider trading rule or a no insider trading rule.
Manne concedes that individuals do in fact lose as a result of insider
trading. He concedes that his arguments and analysis of the market, which
take up a substantial portion of his book, do not constitute a strong argu-
ment against a rule prohibiting insider trading. Without substantial evi-
dence that in our society entrepreneurs can be equated with insiders, and
insider trading profits can be equated with entrepreneurial profits, he has
failed to establish his conclusion that "a rule allowing insiders to trade
fully may be fundamental to the survival of our corporate system.' -
Unless a great deal of concrete evidence can be submitted in support of
this thesis, we can expect to see the SEC and a long line of plaintiffs, like
the unidentified female law student Professor Manne describes, stamping
their feet before the courts, angrily declaiming, "I don't care; it's [insider
trading] just not right.'"
Paul L. Wright*
' MANNE, op. cit. supra note 1, at 110.
'Id. at 233 n.42.
* B.A., Harvard College; B. Litt., Trinity College, Oxford University; LL.B., Harvard Univer-
sity. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. Trial attorney, United States Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, 1956-1961.
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